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En este artículo estudiamos el efecto de la descentralización de la provisión y 
financiación de un bien provisto públicamente hasta el nivel local de gobierno sobre 
los niveles de segregación por ingreso en áreas urbanas. De acuerdo con lo que 
sugiere la literatura teórica anterior, la provisión y financiación local genera, por sí 
sola, incentivos que promueven la segregación en función del ingreso. No obstante, 
en las áreas urbanas existen otras fuerzas segregadoras, tales como determinadas 
características exógenas locales, actuando al mismo tiempo. El análisis demuestra 
que, una vez se tiene en cuenta este importante rasgo de las economías urbanas, 
la descentralización reducirá la segregación por ingreso si la población tiene 
preferencias heterogéneas por el bien provisto públicamente. 
 





We investigate how decentralizing the provision and funding of a publicly provided 
good from central (or regional) to local governments affects income segregation in 
an urban area. As the previous theoretical literature suggests, local provision and 
funding of a publicly provided good by itself generates incentives for income 
segregation. However, other segregating forces such as local amenities are also at 
work in urban areas. We show that, once this important feature of urban economies 
is considered, decentralisation will reduce income segregation if the population has 
heterogeneous preferences for the publicly provided good. 
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 1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the relation among two key issues for urban public economics
and ﬁscal federalism: income segregation and ﬁscal decentralization. In particular,
the aim of the paper is to provide a positive analysis of the impact of ﬁscal decen-
tralization up to the local level of government on urban income segregation.
Income segregation across locations (communities, neighborhoods) in urban areas
is a prevalent phenomenon all around the world. Such phenomenon has shown a
tendency to intensify over the past few decades (UN-Habitat, 2001). The increas-
ing concern for this issue stems from the serious eﬃciency and, especially, equity
consequences it involves.
Income segregation generates important diﬀerences in the process of human cap-
ital accumulation among children and youths with diﬀerent socioeconomic back-
grounds. Because the social environment in which the child grows is important to
her acquisition of human capital, those who grow up in deprived areas ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to acquire the level of human capital needed for leaving poverty. Income segregation
thus facilitates the emergence of poverty traps or ghettos and the perpetuation of
poverty and income inequality across generations. It is in this respect remarkable
the recent appearance of an economic memberhisps theory of poverty (e.g. Durlauf,
2002). In this theory, income segregation in urban areas is a major cause of the
emergence and perpetuation of poverty areas.
There exists at least another important mechanism linking income segregation
and inequality: income segregation may reduce the social attachment among diﬀerent
income groups in society, reducing the willingness of the rich to make transfers to
the poor and leading to a less redistributive economy and to a more unequal society
(Bjorvatn and Cappelen, 2003; see also Pauly, 1973). This explains the empirical
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A:ﬁnding that countries with large inequalities in pre-tax income distribution are less
redistributive than those with more even income distributions (e.g. Basset et al,
1999).
The eﬃciency consequences of income segregation are more controversial. Given
that it hinders individuals’ human capital accumulation in deprived areas, it may
easily trigger the exclusion of part of the population from the labor market (Bénabou,
1993). Even if this is not so but individual factors of production are complements,
the low levels of human capital a part of the population has may be a signiﬁcant
burden for aggregate productivity (Bénabou, 1996a and 1996b).
Moizeau et al. (2003) investigate the role informational neighborhood eﬀects
have as a segregating force and as an ineﬃciency source, once segregation has taken
place. In their model, young individuals choose whether to invest into education
or not assessing the beneﬁts of such investment by observing the experience of the
older generation living in their neighborhood. Segregated equilibria may emerge
and cause young individuals (from rich and poor households) to misperceive returns
to education and not to exert any educational eﬀort: young individuals from poor
households live in deprived areas and observe that their adult neighbors are all low
income, irrespective of their decision to invest or not to invest into education; those
from rich households live in wealthy areas and observe adults who, whatever the
educational eﬀort exerted when young, are all high income.
The economics literature oﬀers several explanations to the emergence of income
segregation. Urban public economics, the branch of research to which our work be-
longs, explains how the local provision of goods and services leads to diﬀerences in
the level of provision that generate perfect segregation across jurisdictions according
to the characteristic in which households vary (Epple et al. 1993, Bénabou, 1996a,
Ross and Yinger, 1999). An important and related literature on the economics of
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A:education highlights that diﬀerences in the quality of local public schools trigger
segregation processes across school districts and neighborhoods in residence-based
public schooling systems (Epple and Romano, 2002). These results are central for
our research.
The classical urban economics model of Alonso-Mills-Muth (see for example Mills,
2000) oﬀers an explanation using a model in which diﬀerent locations of an urban
area diﬀer in their distance from a Central Business District where population goes to
work. In this model equilibrium land prices are set so as to compensate for diﬀerences
in distance (i.e. land which is closer to the centre becomes more expensive). Income
sorting of households according to their level of income emerges from diﬀerences in
their willingness to pay for land located at diﬀerent distances from the centre: lower
income households are willing to pay more per unit of land closer to the centre because
they demand a smaller amount of this good.
Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport (2000) and Glaeser and Kahn (2004), in turn, at-
tribute the largest responsibility for social segregation to urban sprawl ultimately
originated by the automobile-based modern way of life. Because cars are expensive,
suburbs with no public transportation are more accessible to high income house-
holds. The poor who cannot aﬀord a car, in turn, are obliged to live around public
transportation, mainly in central cities.
In opposition to the North-American case, European central cities are mainly
inhabited by the wealthy, while poverty areas are usually located in the suburbs.
Still within urban economics, Brueckner et al. (1999) provide an explanation to this
puzzle and a further cause of segregation: the existence of exogenous amenities which
modify the inherent appeal of diﬀerent location alternatives. The willingness to pay
for living in the best alternatives usually increases with the level of income, which
causes higher income households to concentrate within them. In opposition to the
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A:US, central cities in Europe are usually more attractive than the suburbs because of
their exogenous (and endogenous) amenities. This explains why the rich live there.
On the other hand, ﬁscal decentralization has been spreading in most developed
and developing countries in the last three decades. The paper on the issue prepared
by Dennis Epple and Thomas Nechyba for the new volume of the Handbook of Public
Economics (Epple and Nechyba, 2004) remarks the importance of this process. It
also highlights the need to further investigate its consequences over several aspects of
economic and political behavior and performance. One particular aspect Epple and
Nechyba emphasize is the importance of considering households residential mobility
into these analyses. In a world of high residential mobility, it is crucial to analyze
households’ location behavior in response to a process of ﬁscal decentralization.
Our main objective in this work is to demonstrate that a process of ﬁscal de-
centralization leading to local provision and funding of a good or service the public
sector supplies may promote income integration rather than income segregation in
urban areas. As the previous urban public economics literature suggests, local provi-
sion and funding of a publicly provided good generates by itself incentives for income
segregation. However, other segregating forces such as local amenities are also at
work in urban areas. We show that once this important feature of urban economies
is considered, decentralization will reduce income segregation if the population has
heterogeneous preferences for the publicly provided good.
We also investigate the segregation patterns that may characterize equilibrium
in a system of two communities when they diﬀer in the level of provision of the
good or service they supply and in the level of an exogenous amenity. This can be
seen as an extension of Nechyba (1997a): this author proves existence of equilibrium
in a quite general multi-community model with exogenous amenities but does not
investigate the segregation patterns that may arise in equilibrium when such amenities
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A:are relevant.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present
and begin the analysis of the model. It is a simple model of an urban area made up
by two communities which diﬀer in some exogenous amenity that makes one of them
more attractive than the other. Households can freely choose where to live as long as
they are willing to pay the price of a house in the community they choose. The public
sector, which may be centralized or decentralized, collects taxes to produce a good
or service which is provided free of charge. Section 3 analyzes the central question
of the paper: how ﬁscal decentralization aﬀects levels of income segregation. Section
4 investigates the diﬀerent segregation patterns that may arise in equilibrium when
the public sector is decentralized. Finally, some concluding remarks are in section 5.
2T h e M o d e l
The model represents a metropolitan area made up by two communities (let us call
them 1 and 2) whose boundaries and land endowment are exogenously determined.
These communities diﬀer in a set of exogenous amenities (environmental quality,
landscape, distance to the Central Business District, protection against natural dis-
asters, height and, therefore, climate, etc.) which make one of them inherently more
attractive than the other. We denote the level of exogenous amenity available in
community i as ai and assume a1 <a 2.
Each one of these communities has a local housing market. We take on a simple
speciﬁcation to model these markets: houses are identical and therefore each one
requires one lot of land of ﬁxed size. We assume each household consumes one (and
only one) unit of housing at net-of-tax market price ph. T h i sa s s u m p t i o nh a sa
broader interpretation than could be initially thought. Following De Bartolomé and
Ross (2003), it can be considered that the components of housing not related to land
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A:are included in the numeraire. Thus, it is the size of the land plot which is exogenously
ﬁxed and not housing consumption. As communities have a ﬁxed amount of land,
each one can oﬀer a maximum amount of housing which we denote Hi. The housing
supply curve has a backward L-shape in both communities: horizontal at construction
cost (c) until the community’s maximum capacity is reached and vertical at that point
(see ﬁgures 1 and 2). This simple way of modelling housing markets facilitates the
analysis without altering the results of the model.
The metropolitan area is inhabited by a continuum of households whose mass is
normalized to 1. Households may change residence without incurring in any mobility
costs. They diﬀer in their level of exogenous income (y) and in a parameter measuring
the intensity of their preferences for a publicly provided good (α)3. Consequently,
population is characterized by a continuous bivariate density function f(y,α) strictly
positive in its domain. D ≡ [α,α] × [y,y] ⊂ <2
+.
We also assume H1 + H2 > 1 and H1,H 2 < 1. In words, this means that the
metropolitan area is large enough as to accommodate the whole population but nei-
ther of the communities has enough space to do it by itself.
There are three goods: the numeraire (b)h o u s i n g( h) and the publicly provided
good (x). Assumptions 1 and 2 establish the properties of the preference relation we
adopt in this model. As all houses are identical and each household consumes only
one unit of housing we use a utility function which does not include this good.
3The assumption that preferences for the publicly provided good vary across households is a
natural one. See Epple and Platt (1998) and Kessler and Lülfesmann (forthcoming) for theoretical
analysis in which households diﬀer by income and preferences. Recent empirical evidence on house-
holds’ residential choices within urban contexts (Bayer et al. 2003, Epple and Sieg, 1999, and Epple
et al. 2001) strongly supports the hypothesis that households vary with respect to their preferences
for publicly provided goods.
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A:Assumption 1 Households’ preferences are represented by the utility function U(a,x,b;α)=
u(a,x;α)+z(b) which is twice continuously diﬀerentiable for all (a,x,b) >> 0,i n -
creasing in all its arguments, strictly quasi-concave in (a,x) and strictly concave in
b.
Therefore, preferences are continuous, strictly convex and strictly monotonic. No
result of the model requires that the utility function is separable in b and (a,x) nor
that it be strictly concave in b. Nevertheless, these assumptions facilitate analysis
and exposition. For example, the property of separability lets us directly know which
community is more appealing in terms of its combination of exogenous quality and
the level of provision it oﬀers.
Assumption 2 deﬁnes the role of α in the utility function.
Assumption 2 1 . T h em a r g i n a lr a t eo fs u b s t i t u t i o na m o n gt h ep u b l i c l yp r o v i d e d
good and the numeraire (MRSx,b) and the marginal rate of substitution among the
publicly provided good and community exogenous quality (MRSx,a) both increase with
α.
2. The marginal rate of substitution among community exogenous quality and the
numeraire (MRSa,b) does not vary with α.
By assumption 2 a household’s valuation of the publicly provided good in terms
of both the numeraire and community’s exogenous quality increases with α.T h i s
assumption also implies that the taste parameter α does not aﬀect a household’s
relative preference among a and b. Assumption 2 is satisﬁed for example by any
separable utility function (e.g. 1
1−σ
¡
a1−σ + αx1−σ + b1−σ¢
), by any Cobb-Douglas
utility function of the form U(a,x,b)=kaβxαbγ or by any CES utility function of
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A:Note that, because our utility function is separable in (a,x) and b,t h em a r g i n a l
utility of the numeraire does not vary with α. Given assumption 2, this has two
implications: ﬁrst, because the marginal rate of substitution MRSx,b increases with
α, the marginal utility of the publicly provided good increases with the taste parameter
(i.e. uxα(a,x;α) > 0); second, given that the marginal rate of substitution MRSa,b
does not vary with α, the marginal utility of a community exogenous quality does not
change with the taste parameter (i.e. uaα(a,x;α)=0 ).
For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that the publicly provided good is a
private good. Once again, the results of the work readily extend to other kind of
goods with no qualitative alteration. For example, this is true in the case where the
public sector provides a local public good, i.e. a good whose beneﬁts are indivisible
(to some extent) and non-excludable but only for the residents of a community. This
good is produced using the numeraire as the only input and its units are normalized
so that one unit of output coincides with one unit of the numeraire. Production
technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
The public sector may be centralized, that is made up by one single unit of gov-
ernment whose scope is the whole metropolitan area, or decentralized, i.e., made up
by two local governments each one with scope within one of the communities. Col-
lective choices are made through majority voting in the corresponding jurisdiction.
We assume the central government is ﬁnanced by a proportional income tax, whereas
local governments are funded by a proportional local property tax4.
This assumption deserves some explanation. Fisrt, this choice of tax instruments
is consistent with reality: the greatest part of local governments’ funding (ignoring
transfers) comes from property tax in most developed countries (a prominent exam-
ple is the US), while higher levels of government are usually funded by income taxes.
4Note that when all houses are identical, this is equivalent to a head tax.
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A:Second, Nechyba (1997b) shows that the choice of property tax is a dominant strat-
egy for local governments that act in a competitive environment (that is, one with
mobility) when they can chose between that tax and income taxation 5.I n s o m e
countries like Sweden or Switzerland, nonetheless, local governments are ﬁnanced
through local income taxation. Local income taxation implies the existence of redis-
tribution within communities from households with income above the mean towards
those with income below the mean. Consequently, it may alter residential location
choices. Goodspeed (1989) provides restrictions on preferences under which perfect
income sorting across communities necessarily characterizes equilibrium. Under sim-
ilar conditions, our results would extend to the case in which local governments also
use an income tax.
Each government uses its proceeds to produce the publicly provided good in
quantity x and to oﬀer it to each citizen in its jurisdiction. We assume that under a
centralized institutional scheme public sector is restricted to oﬀering the same level
of output of this good to the inhabitants of both communities. This assumption re-
quires that a community demographic composition does not aﬀect the level of output
of the good received by its inhabitants (as we suppose in this paper). Alternatively, it
requires that the production process allows the central government to compensate dif-
ferences in the level of output stemming from communities’ demographic composition
through diﬀerences in expenditures across communities6.
5See also Nechyba (2003) and Ross and Yinger (1999) on this issue.
6For some goods, like education and public safety this assumption may not be appropriate. In
both cases the demographic layout of a community seems to aﬀect the level of output received by
its inhabitants. This is reasonably well documented, at least when it comes to education (see Epple
and Romano, 2002a). Furthermore, it may not be possible for a central government to homogenize
the level of output between communities. This may occur due to lack of information, to the non-
substitutability of demographic and economic inputs or to the collective choice mechanism.
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A:Governments must balance their budgets. Hence, there is a one-to-one relation
between tax rate and provision levels determined by the relevant government’s budget
constraint. If the public sector is centralized, the income tax rate (ty) is unique and
the provision level is equal in both communities. The central government’s budget





If the public sector is decentralized, the budget constraint of local government i
i sg i v e nb yt h ee x p r e s s i o n :
Nixi = tipi
hNi (2)
where Ni represents community i’s population mass, ti its property tax rate and pi
h
the net-of-tax housing prices in that community.
Every household must: (i) choose the community in which to live, (ii) vote in
their community’s local elections on the pair (ti,x i) or in the general elections on
the pair (ty,x); and (iii) decide how much of their disposable income (income after
paying taxes and housing) devote to consumption of the numeraire. As households are
atomistic they behave as price-takers and so they take all the variables characterizing
communities as given. The budget constraint of a household with income y living in
community i if the public sector is centralized is:
b ≤ y(1 − ty) − pi
h (3)
If the public sector is decentralized it is deﬁned as:
b ≤ y − pi (4)
where pi = pi
h(1 + ti), is the gross-of-tax housing price.
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A:These choices are made in three stages within a single period of time. In the
ﬁrst one households choose where to live, taking into account their (correct) expec-
tations over the equilibrium vector of provision level/s, tax rate/s and housing prices
(e∗ =( x,ty,p 1
h,p 2
h) with a centralized public sector and e∗ =( x1,t 1,p 1
h,x 2,t 2,p 2
h) in
a decentralized system), as well as the level of the exogenous amenity available in
each community: a1 and a2. At this stage housing markets clear and housing prices
are set. In the second stage households vote in local or general elections taking their
community demographic composition and housing price as given. Finally, in the third
stage they decide what amount of the numeraire to consume.
The notion of free-mobility equilibrium we use in the model in this paper is as
follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Equilibrium. We deﬁne an equilibrium as a partition of households
between communities, an allocation (x,b) for each household and a vector of provision
level(s), tax rate(s) and housing prices e∗ =( x1,t 1,p 1
h,x 2,t 2,p 2
h) which satisfy:
1. Rational choices: each household’s vector (a,x,b) is the utility maximizing
alternative within their choice set. This implies that no-one wants to change commu-
nities in equilibrium.
2. Housing market equilibrium: housing supply equals demand in both communi-
ties.
3. Voting equilibrium: in every election the (t,x) pair chosen satisﬁes the budget
constraint of the relevant government and is preferred by a majority of voters in the
corresponding jurisdiction. A (t,x) pair is preferred by a majority if it is preferred
by at least half the voters when compared to any other pair satisfying the budget
constraint.
The main objective of the model is to determine the impact of ﬁscal decentral-
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A:ization on the levels of income segregation. Consequently, we must carefully explain
which notions of income segregation we follow. The segregation concepts we use
are deﬁned following Epple et al. (1993) and Epple and Romano (1998). First, we
informally say that an equilibrium exhibits perfect income segregation across commu-
nities if every household living in the community with highest average income has
higher income than any household of the community with lowest average income. In
this type of equilibrium income segregation in the city is maximum given the size of
communities.
Second, we say that an equilibrium shows perfect taste segregation across com-
munities if every household living in one community has stronger preferences for
the publicly provided good than any of the households residing in the other one.
In this kind of equilibrium there is no income segregation. Both communities are
inhabited by households from all levels of income and the mix of households with
diﬀerent income levels in each community is maximum. This is the kind of allocation
of households to communities according to preferences referred to by Tiebout (1956).
Finally, roughly speaking an equilibrium shows two dimensions segregation if all
households with identical preferences are perfectly segregated according to income
across communities and, at the same time, all households with the same income level
are perfectly segregated according to their preferences across communities. When
an equilibrium exhibits two dimensions segregation several outcomes are possible. It
may be the case that one or both communities are inhabited by households from all
income levels or, at the other extreme, that income segregation across communities
is almost maximum. That is to say, that almost all the inhabitants in one of them
are richer than almost all households living in the other one.
We have a more precise deﬁnition for all these notions:
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A:Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium:
1. Exhibits perfect income segregation across communities if each one is inhabited
by households from a single income interval and these intervals do not overlap.
2. Exhibits perfect taste segregation across communities if each one is inhab-
ited by households whose taste parameter α belongs to a single interval and intervals
corresponding to each community do not overlap.
3. Exhibits segregation in two dimensions if ∀α | ∃y = b y(α) which makes a
household indiﬀerent among both communities, households with identical preferences
are perfectly segregated by income across communities and if, at the same time, ∀y |
∃α = b α(y) which makes a household indiﬀerent among both communities, households
w i t ht h es a m el e v e lo fi n c o m ea r ep e r f e c t l ysegregated across communities according
to their preferences.
Before we come to analyze the segregation patterns which may emerge under
one institutional scheme and the other, we will present some common results which
will be useful below. As preferences are strictly monotonic, households spend all
their income. Thus, they devote all they have left after paying taxes and housing
to consumption of the numeraire. Hence, the indirect utility function is obtained by
plugging the household’s binding budget constraint into the utility function U(a,x,b).
With a centralized public sector, it is deﬁned as:
v(a,x,ty,p h,y,α)=u(a,x;α)+z(y(1 − ty) − ph) (5)
Whereas with a decentralized public sector it is written as:
v(a,x,t,ph,y,α)=u(a,x;α)+z(y − ph(1 + t)) (6)
It is important to note that, because U(a,x,b) is a continuously diﬀerentiable func-
tion, the indirect utility function has the same properties.
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A:With an aim to characterize the segregation patterns appearing in equilibrium we
follow Epple and Platt (1998) to deﬁne a geometrical locus that we call indiﬀerence
locus and we denote b y(α):
Deﬁnition 3 The indiﬀerence locus is a geometrical locus (with zero measure) that,
given the combination of exogenous quality of the communities, tax rate(s), provision
level(s), and housing prices, establishes the pairs (α,y) which make households indif-
ferent between both communities. In the case in which the public sector is centralized
it is implicitly deﬁned by the expression:
v(a1,x,t y,p 1
h, b y(α),α)=v(a2,x,t y,p 2
h, b y(α),α) (7)
or else by:
u(a1,x;α)+z(b y(α)(1 − t) − p1
h)=u(a2,x;α)+z(b y(α)(1 − t) − p2
h) (8)
If, on the contrary, the public sector is decentralized, the formal implicit deﬁnition is
then:
v(a1,x 1,t 1,p 1
h, b y(α),α)=v(a2,x 2,t 2,p 2
h, b y(α),α) (9)
or:
u(a1,x 1;α)+z(b y(α) − p1)=u(a2,x 2;α)+z(b y(α) − p2) (10)
A relevant property of the indiﬀerence locus is that it is continuously diﬀerentiable
for all (α,y) >> 0 whenever p1
h 6= p2
h (p1 6= p2 in the case of a decentralized public
sector). This property is assured by the continuity and diﬀerentiability of the indirect
utility function and by the implicit function theorem. The fact that the indiﬀerence
locus b y(α) is not diﬀerentiable when p1
h = p2
h is irrelevant for the analysis. As we will
see, the indiﬀerence locus is in this case vertical in the plane (α,y).
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A:Lemma 1 establishes that, in every equilibrium, the space of characteristics is
partitioned by the indiﬀerence locus. It refers to the case where the public sector
is decentralized. This result can nevertheless be easily extended to an institutional
scheme where the public sector is centralized. For notation simplicity, let us denote
a household’s indirect utility function with characteristics (α,y) when they live in
community i as vi(y,α).
Lemma 1 In every equilibrium, the characteristics space D ≡ [α,α]×[y,y] ⊂ <2
+ is
partitioned by the indiﬀerence locus b y(α).
Proof. First, we must remember that due to continuity of the indirect utility func-
tion, the indiﬀerence locus -if it exists- is continuous. We will ﬁrst prove the result for
t h ec a s ew h e r ep1 6= p2.I fp1 6= p2 a si ti ss h o w nb yl e m m a2 ,t h ei n d i ﬀerence locus
cannot be vertical in the (α,y) plane. On the other hand, as no household wishes
to change communities in equilibrium, they are all maximizing utility. Moreover,
both communities must be inhabited, as no community has enough space for all the
population. Consequently, the following condition must be satisﬁed:
∀α ∈ [α0,α0] ⊆ [α,α]∃y,y0 ∈ [y,y],y6= y0 |
| v1(y,α) >v 2(y,α),v 1(y0,α) <v 2(y0,α) (11)
with α ≤ α0 < α0 ≤ α. The partial derivative of the indirect utility function with
respect to income is:
∂vi(y,α)
∂y
= z0(y − pi) (12)
Hence, because by assumption 1 z(·) is a strictly concave function, the higher the
gross-of-tax housing price, the higher this derivative will be for all levels of income.
That is to say, utility always increases faster with income in the community which
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A:has the higher gross-of-tax housing price. The reason is that the marginal utility of
consumption is higher in that place. Thus, if condition (11) is satisﬁed, ∀α ∈ [α0,α0] ⊆
[α,α] there must also be a unique level of income b y(α) t h a tm a k e sh o u s e h o l d sw i t h
characteristics (α, b y(α)) indiﬀerent.
For the case where p1 = p2, lemma 2 proves that, if it exists, the indiﬀerence locus
must be vertical in (α,y) space. In this case, as everyone is maximizing utility and
both communities must be inhabited, the following condition is satisﬁed:
∀y ∈ [y,y]∃α,α0 ∈ [α,α],α6= α0 |
| v1(y,α) >v 2(y,α),v 1(y,α0) <v 2(y,α0) (13)
The indirect utility function corresponding to community i partial derivative with
respect to the taste parameter is:
∂vi(y,α)
∂α
= uα(ai,x i;α) (14)
By assumption 2, this derivative is higher the higher the community level of provision
for all levels of income. That is to say, utility increases faster with parameter α in
that community oﬀering a higher amount of this good. Consequently, if (13) is satis-
ﬁed, there will necessarily be a unique e α that makes households with characteristics
(e α,y),∀y ∈ [y,y] indiﬀerent between the two communities.
One way for establishing the segregation patterns that may emerge in equilibrium
consists on establishing the sign of the slope of the indiﬀerence locus in the (α,y)
plane. Lemma 2 studies the determinants of this sign. We will again state this lemma
referring to the case in which the public sector is decentralized. We assumed that
central government oﬀers identical levels of provision in both communities. Thus,
only part 3 of the lemma is relevant to this case. It is immediate to demonstrate that
the result extends readily to such institutional scheme.
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A:Lemma 2 Given a1 <a 2 and the equilibrium vector of housing prices, tax rates and
levels of provision, the slope of the indiﬀerence locus in the (α,y) plane will be:
1. Positive: (i) If x1 >x 2 and p1 <p 2; (ii) if x1 <x 2 and p1 >p 2.
2. Negative: (i) If x1 >x 2 and p1 >p 2; (ii) if x1 <x 2 and p1 <p 2.
3. Equal to cero: If x1 = x2.
Vertical: If p1 = p2.




uα(a2,x 2;α) − uα(a1,x 1 ;α)
z0(b y(α) − p1) − z0(b y(α) − p2)
(15)
By assumption 2, uxα(a,x;α) > 0 and uaα(a,x;α)=0 , the sign of the numerator
in (15) will be positive, negative or equal to zero if (and only if) x1 <x 2, x1 >x 2 or
x1 = x2.B e c a u s ez(·) is assumed to be strictly concave, the sign of the denominator
will be positive, negative or equal to zero if (and only if) p1 >p 2, p1 <p 2 or
p1 = p2. These results establish parts 1 and 2 of the lemma. For part 3 and 4
it is also necessary to consider that given a1 <a 2: ﬁrst, when x1 = x2, p1 <p 2.
Otherwise, the allocation cannot be an equilibrium because everyone would want to
live in community 2; second, for p1 = p2 to be fulﬁlled in equilibrium, provision levels
must satisfy x1 >x 2. Otherwise, everyone would want to live in community 2, and
therefore, the economy would not be in equilibrium. On the other hand, if p1 = p2
the indiﬀerence locus slope is equal to inﬁnite, as the denominator is equal to zero.
Every household located out of the indiﬀerence locus in the characteristics space
have a strict preference for one of the two communities. A ﬁnal element to estab-
lish the segregation patterns emerging in each case consists on determining where
households located out of this locus live. Lemma 3 answers this question:
17
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A:Lemma 3 If households with characteristics (e α, b y(e α)) are indiﬀerent between the two
communities, then:
1. Households with characteristics (e α,y) ∀y>(<)b y(e α) strictly prefer the com-
munity with the higher (lower) gross-of-tax housing price.
2. Households with characteristics (α,y(e α)) ∀α>(<)e α strictly prefer the com-
munity with the higher (lower) provision level
Proof. 1. The indirect utility function partial derivative with respect to income is
higher the higher the gross-of-tax housing price in the community. This implies that
indirect utility functions corresponding to both communities cross at most once in
the (y,U) plane, with that corresponding to the highest gross-of-tax housing price
community crossing the other from below. As a consequence, for income levels above
(below) this crossing point utility will be greater in the community with the higher
(lower) gross-of-tax housing price.
2. It is immediate to establish that indirect utility functions corresponding to
both communities cross at most once in the (α,U) plane, with that corresponding
to the community oﬀering the largest amount of the publicly provided good crossing
the other from below. This implies that for levels of α a b o v e( b e l o w )t h eo n ec o r -
responding to that crossing point, utility will be higher in the community with the
higher (lower) provision level.
From the previous results, it is possible to determine the segregation patterns
which will necessarily characterize equilibrium for any vector of housing prices, tax
rates and provision levels. This is done in corollary 1. In other words, corollary 1
establishes necessary and suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium to be characterized by
perfect segregation of households across communities according to income or pref-
erences or by two-dimensions segregation. Once again we do it for an institutional
18
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A:scheme characterized by a decentralized public sector, the result being easily extended
to the public sector’s alternative conﬁguration.
Corollary 1 An equilibrium shows:
1. Perfect income segregation across communities if and only if the slope of the
indiﬀerence locus in the (α,y) plane is equal to zero; i.e., if and only if x1 = x2 and
consequently p1 <p 2. In this kind of equilibrium higher income individuals live in
community 2, that is to say, in the community with the highest gross-of-tax housing
price.
2. Perfect segregation according to preferences across communities if and only
if the slope of the indiﬀerence locus in the (α,y) plane is equal to inﬁnite, i.e, if
and only if p1 = p2 and hence x1 >x 2. In this kind of equilibrium households with
stronger preferences for the publicly provided good live in community 1, that is to say,
the community with the highest provision level.
3. Segregation in two dimensions if and only if x1 6= x2 and p1 6= p2.
Proof. 1. By lemma 1, if in equilibrium x1 = x2,t h e np1 <p 2 must be fulﬁlled.
Moreover, the indiﬀerence locus has a slope equal to zero in the (α,y) plane. This
implies that if a household with characteristics (α, e y) is indiﬀerent between both com-
munities then ∀α ∈ [α,α],households with characteristics (α, e y) are also indiﬀerent
between both communities. On the other hand, by lemma 3, if the former is ful-
ﬁlled, households with characteristics (α,y), ∀α ∈ [α,α], ∀y>(<)b y strictly prefer
the community with the higher (lower) gross-of-tax housing prices, i.e community 2
(community 1).
2. We proved in lemma 1 that if in equilibrium p1 = p2,t h e nx1 >x 2 and the
indiﬀerence locus has a slope equal to inﬁnite in (α,y) space. This implies that if
a household with characteristics (e α,y) is indiﬀerent between both communities then
19∀y ∈ [y,y], households with characteristics (e α,y) are also indiﬀerent between the two
communities. On the other hand, by lemma 3, if the former is fulﬁlled, households
with characteristics (α,y), ∀y ∈ [y,y], ∀α>(<)e α strictly prefer the community with
the higher (lower) provision level, i.e. community 1 (community 2).
3. Given deﬁnition 2, an equilibrium will show segregation in two dimensions if
and only if the slope of the indiﬀerence locus is diﬀerent from zero and from inﬁnite.
L e m m a2p r o v e st h i sh a p p e n sw h e n e v e rx1 6= x2 and p1 6= p2.
Finally, another important result which also extends to both institutional schemes
is the existence of a unique voting equilibrium. We begin this analysis by specifying
the information which is actually available to voters. We assume they are aware of
the corresponding government’s budget constraint: that of central government in the
case of centralization (1), that of their local government in the case of a decentralized
public sector (2). On the other hand, because location choices are already taken at
the time of voting and housing markets are in equilibrium, communities demographic
composition and housing prices are given. We assume voters are also aware of this.
Hence, the model’s sequence of decisions renders unnecessary the assumption that
voters are myopic about the eﬀects of the election on communities’ demographic
composition and housing prices.
Given these assumptions, the strict quasi-concavity of the utility function and
the linearity of the public sector’s budget constraint under both institutional ar-
rangements, preferences over the tax rate or -equivalently- over the provision level
are always single-peaked. Consequently, Black’s median voter theorem (1948) assures
the existence of a unique voting equilibrium in all cases.
With a centralized system of government, the preferred tax rate and provision
20levels for a household with characteristics (α,y) living in community i are deﬁned as:
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In a decentralized system of government, in turn, the most preferred tax rate and
provision level of a household with characteristics (α,y) when living in community i
are deﬁned as:
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3 The impact of ﬁs c a ld e c e n t r a l i z a t i o no ni n c o m es e g r e g a t i o n
In this section we use the model just presented to determine the impact of ﬁscal
decentralization on the level of income segregation in urban areas. To this end,
we will determine which segregation patterns may characterize equilibrium under a
centralized institutional scheme and which ones may arise with a decentralized public
sector.
213.1 Centralized public sector
In our model, the centralized public sector is made up by a unique government whose
jurisdiction consists of communities 1 and 2. Our results do not depend on this level of
government being deﬁned at the level of the metropolitan area or of a more extensive
jurisdiction (regional, national). This level of government imposes a proportional
income tax and uses the proceeds to produce the publicly provided good. The central
government oﬀers the same amount of this good to every household in the economy.
Proposition 1 establishes some necessary conditions an allocation must satisfy to
be an equilibrium. This proposition proves the existence of a unique allocation of
households to communities compatible with equilibrium. Such allocation exhibits
perfect segregation by income across communities.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, with a centralized public sector:
1. c = p1
h <p 2
h and community 2 is fully developed (see ﬁgures 1 and 2).
2. Perfect income segregation across communities: each community is inhabited
by households belonging to a single income interval. Income intervals corresponding
to each community do not overlap. The allocation of households to communities is
such that households of higher income live in community 2.
Proof. 1. Because tax rates and provision levels are identical in both communities,
if p2
h ≤ p1
h held, everyone would want to live in community 2. But this is incompat-
ible with a situation of equilibrium. On the other hand, if community 2 were not
completely developed, housing prices would equal the cost of construction and there
would not be capitalization, which is also incompatible with equilibrium. Finally,
given the assumptions on the relationship between communities’ capacity and popu-
lation mass, the fact that community 2 is totally developed implies that community 1
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in the latter community must equal construction costs.
2. This result is proved in corollary 1 for the case of a decentralized govern-
ment system. This result readily extends to the case in which the public sector is
centralized.
In our model, households’ preferences for communities’ exogenous quality are
identical and the marginal rate of substitution among the exogenous amenity and
the numeraire does not vary with α. With a centralized public sector, communities
only diﬀer in their level of the exogenous amenity a. Hence, the only diﬀerence in
households’ willingness to pay for housing in the more appealing community (com-
munity 2) stems from diﬀerences in income. Those households with a higher income
level are willing to pay more for housing in community 2, since their marginal utility
of numeraire consumption is lower. As a result, the only allocation of households
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Figure 2
with higher income households living in community 2. Figure 3 depicts how the
characteristics space is partitioned in equilibrium.
Another relevant property of this equilibrium is the capitalization of diﬀerences
in exogenous quality into housing prices. Community 2 is inherently more appealing
than community 1 and this is reﬂected in equilibrium housing prices. To be precise,
the housing price diﬀerential reﬂects how households with an income equal to that of
indiﬀerence value the diﬀerence in exogenous quality among both communities.
3.2 Decentralized public sector
The decentralized public sector is made up of two local governments which oﬀer the
publicly provided good in their corresponding communities. Each local government
may impose a proportional property tax on its constituents. For the sake of simplicity,






         y 
) ( ˆ α y
Figure 3
technology of production is such that all households living in a jurisdiction receive a
homogenous amount of the publicly provided good. Finally, under this institutional
arrangement, collective choices are adopted through a political process within each
community again simpliﬁed to majority voting.
In order to explain the integrating eﬀect of ﬁscal decentralization we demonstrate
that, under a decentralized institutional scheme, the allocation of households between
communities cannot exhibit perfect segregation by income, unless in extremely rare
circumstances.
Using results in lemmas 2 and 3 and those of corollary 1 we are able to establish:
Proposition 2 Under decentralization, the allocation of households to communities
cannot exhibit perfect income segregation unless voting in both communities results in
identical provision levels.
25Proof. Lemma 2 demonstrates that whenever x1 6= x2 the slope of the indiﬀerence
l o c u si sd i ﬀerent from zero. In line with corollary 1, this implies the equilibrium
supporting this allocation does not exhibit perfect income segregation. Only if x1 =
x2 and p1 <p 2 the slope of the indiﬀerence locus b y(α) will be zero and, again in
accordance with corollary 1, the allocation of households to communities will show
perfect segregation by income between communities.
Perfect income segregation will only arise when voting in both communities re-
sults in identical provision levels. It is not possible to dismiss existence of this kind of
equilibrium without imposing additional constraints. However, it is far-fetched. The
reason is that local voting should lead to identical provision levels in both commu-
nities, despite every household living in community 2 has higher income than every
household living in community 1.
Direct comparison between propositions 1 and 2 reveals the main result of the
paper, i.e. that decentralization may promote income integration within urban
economies. The intuition is that, on the one hand, the alternative to ﬁscal decentral-
ization is a reality with segregation and not one where population lives in integrated
cities. This is in line with the diagnosis of the UN’s report on the state of the world’s
cities elaborated by the Centre for the United Nations for Human Settlements (Habi-
tat, 2001). In our stylized model income segregation with a centralized public sector
is maximum. On the other hand, ﬁscal decentralization generates diﬀerences between
jurisdictions’ provision levels. This makes the willingness to pay for living in a partic-
ular community to vary according not only to income but also to preferences for the
publicly provided good: households with relatively strong preferences for this good
are willing to renounce to a larger part of their numeraire consumption or to live in
a community of lower exogenous quality in order to receive a larger amount of that
good. Those with weaker preferences for the publicly provided good are less worried
26about it and more about the exogenous quality of communities and about numeraire
consumption. All this facilitates the exchange of some income segregation for some
tastes sorting.
Our analysis sends a clear message: ﬁscal decentralization may reduce income
segregation across communities in urban areas rather than promote it. It is remarkable
the generality of the result, as it is independent from most assumptions in our model.
Note that the only assumptions we need to establish it are:
(i) The centralized public sector must be able and willing to oﬀer the same level
of output of the publicly provided good in both communities, while local gov-
ernments must be able to adjust their oﬀer to their citizens’ preferences;
(ii) MRSx,b must increase with α;
(iii) MRSa,b must not vary with α.
4 Segregation patterns with a decentralized public sector
We now investigate the segregation patterns which may emerge in equilibrium when
the public sector is decentralized. In this section, we ignore local political processes
and simply characterize how the characteristics space would be partitioned in equi-
librium for each possible conﬁguration of provision levels and gross-of-tax housing
prices.
Several outcomes may emerge: the most appealing community in terms of the
exogenous amenity may also be that oﬀering a larger amount of x. In this situation
such community will be ex-ante (i.e. for p1 = p2) preferred by every household and
equilibrium gross-of-tax housing prices will be higher there. The opposite may also
happen if the community with lower exogenous quality is inhabited by higher income
households or those with particularly strong preferences for the publicly provided
27good. The solution in this case will depend on several factors: communities relative
diﬀerences in exogenous quality and provision levels, the strength of preferences for
the good supplied by the public sector and its variability across households, and
the size of communities. It may be the case that one of the communities is more
appealing than the other for every household in the economy for equal gross-of-tax
housing prices. But it may also happen that the community oﬀering a higher level of
provision is preferred by households with strong preferences for the publicly provided
good, while the other one is preferred by the remaining of the population.
In order to develop this analysis we use results in lemmas 1, 2 and 3 and those in
corollary 1. We will assume a1 <a 2 and will ﬁrst consider equilibria in which x1 <x 2.
Afterwards, we will progressively increase x1 (or decrease x2 or a combination of
both) until x1 >x 2 and the diﬀerence makes all households in the economy prefer
community 1 for p1 = p2. Figures 3 to 9 illustrate how the characteristics space is
p a r t i t i o n e di ne a c ht y p eo fe q u i l i b r i u m .
In the ﬁrst case, community 2 is not only the most appealing one according to its
exogenous quality but also the one oﬀering the largest amount of x.
Case 1 Given a1 <a 2,i fi ne q u i l i b r i u mx1 <x 2,t h e n( ﬁgure 4):
1. u(a1,x 1;α) <u (a2,x 2;α)∀α;
2. p1 <p 2;
3. equilibrium exhibits segregation in two dimensions, with the indiﬀerence locus
being negatively sloped; and
4. if a household with characteristics (e α, e y) is indiﬀerent between the two com-
munities, those with characteristics (e α,y) ∀y>(<)e y strictly prefer community 2
(community 1); those with characteristics (α, e y) ∀α>(<)e α also prefer community 2
(community 1).
28Proof. 1. Since preferences are strictly monotonic: a1 <a 2,x 1 <x 2 ⇒ u(a1,x 1;α) <
u(a2,x 2;α)∀α
2. Given the result of part 1, if p1 ≥ p2 no household would want to live in
community 1, and so the economy would not be in equilibrium.




Given the sign of the indiﬀerence locus, corollary 1 establishes that any equilibrium
must show segregation in two dimensions.
4. This is proved in lemma 3.
Case 1 takes place when the community with higher exogenous appeal is inhabited
by higher income households and/or by households with strong preferences for the
publicly provided good. In this situation, there are households with relatively low
income but with a relatively high taste parameter α w h oa r ew i l l i n gt op a ym o r ef o r
living in community 2 than households with higher income but weaker preferences.
Therefore, there is no perfect income segregation in this type of equilibrium.
If the level of output is identical in both communities, in turn, we have:
Case 2 Given a1 <a 2,i fi ne q u i l i b r i u mx1 = x2,t h e n( ﬁgure 3):
1. u(a1,x 1;α) <u (a2,x 2;α),∀α;
2. p1 <p 2;a n d
3. equilibrium exhibits perfect segregation by income, being those households of
higher income the ones living in community 2.
Proof. 1. Preferences are strictly monotonic, so given a1 <a 2,i fx1 = x2,
u(a1,x 1;α) <u (a2,x 2;α) ∀α.
2. If p1 ≥ p2 held in equilibrium, all households would want to live in community
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corollary 1 this implies that households are perfectly segregated by income across
communities, those households with higher income living in community 2.
As demonstrated in proposition 2, there exists a unique allocation of households
to communities which is compatible with equilibrium in the case where x1 = x2.T h i s
allocation shows perfect segregation by income, the same way it would happen with
a centralized public sector. All households above a certain level of income e y live in
community 2 and all those below it live in community 1. Note that this makes it
very diﬃcult for this kind of equilibrium to exist with a decentralized public sector.
The reason is that all households living in one of the communities are wealthier
than any household living in the other one. Consequently, the political process will
hardly yield identical provision levels. Interestingly, note that income segregation is
maximum when both communities provide the same amount of x.
30Case 3 refers to a situation where x1 >x 2 but community 2 is still ex-ante
preferred by all households in the economy. That is to say, a situation in which the
higher level of provision available in community 1 is not enough to compensate for the
higher exogenous appeal of community 2. Not even for those households for whom
the publicly provided good has the strongest impact on their well-being.
Case 3 Given a1 <a 2, if in equilibrium x1 >x 2 and u(a1,x 1;α) <u (a2,x 2;α)∀α,
then (ﬁgure 5):
1. p1 <p 2;
2. equilibrium shows segregation in two dimensions with a positively sloped indif-
ference locus; and
3. if a household with characteristics (e α,y) is indiﬀerent between the two com-
munities, those with characteristics (e α,y) ∀y>(<)e y strictly prefer community 2
(community 1), whereas those with characteristics (α, e y) ∀α>(<)e α strictly prefer
community 1 (community 2).
Proof. 1. As in case 1, given that u(a1,x 1;α) <u (a2,x 2;α)∀α,i fp1 ≥ p2 were
fulﬁlled no household would want to live in community 1.




In this case corollary 1 establishes that equilibrium shows segregation in two dimen-
sions.
3. This is proved in lemma 3.
In this case, the willingness to pay for living in community 2 increases with income
and decreases as preferences for x become stronger. The reason is that community
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with the same income, that with weaker preferences for the publicly provided good
will be the one willing to pay more for housing in community 2. In this case, income
segregation falls with respect to the case in which x1 = x2:t h a ti st os a y ,a st h e
diﬀerence in the level of provision across communities increases, income segregation
falls. In this kind of equilibrium there are households with relatively low income and
relatively weak preferences for the publicly provided good who are willing to pay more
for living in community 2 than others with higher income and stronger preferences
for such good.
Suppose now that the diﬀerence between x1 and x2 continues increasing such
that some households (those with strongest preferences for the publicly provided
good) prefer community 1 to community 2 for equal gross-of-tax housing prices. If
nevertheless the mass of households for whom the pair (a,x) make community 2 more
desirable is still greater than that community’s capacity, we have:
32Case 4 Given a1 <a 2, if in equilibrium x1 >x 2 and there exist b α ∈ (α,α) such that
u(a1,x 1; b α)=u(a2,x 2; b α),t h e n( ﬁgure 6):





α f(y,α)dαdy > H2,t h e n :
2. p1 <p 2;
3. all households with α ≥ b α live in community 1;
4. the equilibrium shows segregation in two dimensions with a positively sloped
indiﬀerence locus; and
5. if a household with characteristics (e α, e y) is indiﬀerent between the two com-
munities, those with characteristics (e α,y) ∀y>(<)e y strictly prefer community 2
(community 1); while those with characteristics (α, e y) ∀α>(<)e α strictly prefer com-
munity 1 (community 2).






for all α.S o i f u(a1,x 1; b α)=u(a2,x 2; b α),t h e nu(a1,x 1;α) >u (a2,x 2;α),f o ra l l
α>b α;a n du(a1,x 1;α) <u (a2,x 2;α), for all α<b α.
2. If p1 ≥ p2 community 2 would not have land enough so as to accommodate all
households wishing to live in it, so in equilibrium p1 <p 2 must be fulﬁlled.
3. Note that, given all results of parts 1 and 2, in this case v(a1,x 1,p 1,y,α) >
v(a2,x 2,p 2,y,α) ∀y, ∀α ≥ e α.
4. As in all previous cases, this result is immediately derived from lemmas 2 and
3 and from corollary 1.
5. See lemma 3.
In this type of equilibrium, gross-of-tax housing prices are higher in community
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exhibits segregation in two dimensions, and the indiﬀerence locus is positively sloped.
All households with α ≥ b α live in community 1, which is therefore inhabited by
households from all levels of income with a suﬃciently strong preference for the
publicly provided good. Though we do not formally prove it, it is intuitive to think
that the indiﬀerence locus now has a steeper slope than in case 3. Again, it seems
that increases in the diﬀerence among x1 and x2 reduce income segregation.
The kind of equilibrium in case 5 emerges when the diﬀerence among x1 and x2 is
such that each community has land enough so as to accommodate households wishing
to live in it.
Case 5 Given a1 <a 2, if in equilibrium x1 >x 2 and there exists b α ∈ (α,α) such
that u(a1,x 1; b α)=u(a2,x 2; b α),t h e n( ﬁgure 7):
1. u(a1,x 1;α) >u (a2,x 2;α),∀α>b α and u(a1,x 1;α) <u (a2,x 2;α),∀α<b α.









α f(y,α)dαdy ≤ H2,t h e n :
2. p1 = p2;a n d
3. equilibrium exhibits perfect segregation according to preferences, with house-
holds with stronger preferences for the publicly provided good living in community
1.
Proof. 1. This result is exactly the same as that in part 1 of case
2. Given the result of part 1, for p1 = p2 it is fulﬁlled v(a1,x 1,p 1,y,b α)=
v(a2,x 2,p 2,y,b α) ∀y, v(a1,x 1,p 1,y,α) >v (a2,x 2,p 2,y,α) ∀y,∀α>b α and v(a1,x 1,p 1,y,α) <
v(a2,x 2,p 2,y,α) ∀y,∀α<b α. Hence, no household has an incentive to change com-
munities when p1 = p2 and the allocation is an equilibrium. In this situation there
is no competition for living in either of the two communities and housing prices
capitalization does not take place.
3. Lemma 2 demonstrates that in this case the indiﬀerence locus is vertical in
the (α,y) plane. Corollary 1 proves that this implies the population is perfectly
segregated according to preferences across communities, with households with higher
α living in the community with a higher level of provision.
In this case, in equilibrium the gross-of-tax housing price is identical in both
communities. In addition, households are strictly segregated according to their pref-
erences. Hence, in this kind of equilibrium there does not exist income segregation at
all, because households from all income levels are found in both communities. Once
again, an increase in the diﬀerence between x1 and x2 reduces the level of income
segregation.
In case 6 community 1 is small with respect to the mass of population who prefers
it for p1 = p2.
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36u(a2,x 2; b α),t h e n( ﬁgure 8):





b α f(y,α)dαdy > H1,t h e n :
2. p1 >p 2;
3. all households with α ≤ b α live in community 2;
4. equilibrium shows segregation in two dimensions with a negatively sloped indif-
ference locus;
5. if a household with characteristics (e α, e y) is indiﬀerent between the two com-
munities, those with characteristics (e α,y) ∀y>(<)e y strictly prefer community 1
(community 2); in the same way those with characteristics (α, e y) ∀α>(<)e α strictly
prefer community 1 (community 2).
Proof. 1. This result is the same as in part 1 of case
2. Now, if gross-of-tax housing prices fulﬁlled p1 ≤ p2, community 1 would not
have enough capacity to provide housing for all households wanting to live in it. As a
consequence, the economy would not be in equilibrium. Consequently, in equilibrium,
gross-of-tax housing prices in such community must be higher than in community 2.
3. Note that, given the results of parts 1 and 2 in this case: v(a1,x 1,p 1,y,α) <
v(a2,x 2,p 2,y,α) is fulﬁlled for all y and for all α ≤ b α.
4. Part 4 is demonstrated using lemma 2 and corollary 1.
5. Again, this point is demostrated in lemma 3.
Since community 1 is small in relation to the population wishing to live in it,
housing prices ascend till housing demand equals housing supply in that community.
In equilibrium gross-of-tax housing prices are higher there. Community 2 is inhabited
by households from all levels of income with weak enough preferences for the publicly
provided good. Note that now the increase in the diﬀerence among x1 and x2 has led
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to an increase in income segregation.
Finally, case 7 deals with the opposite situation, that is to say, a situation where
all households prefer community 1. The reason is that this community oﬀers the
publicly provided good in a larger enough amount to compensate them for the higher
exogenous appeal of the other community.
Case 7 Given a1 <a 2, if in equilibrium x1 >x 2 and u(a1,x 1;α) >u (a2,x 2;α)∀α,
then (ﬁgure 9):
1. p1 >p 2;
2. equilibrium shows segregation in two dimensions with a negatively sloped indif-
ference locus;
3. if a household with characteristics (e α, e y) is indiﬀerent between the two com-
munities, those with characteristics (e α,y) ∀y>(<)e y strictly prefer community 1
(community 2); also those with characteristics (α, e y) ∀α>(<)e α strictly prefer com-
38munity 1 (community 2).
Proof. 1 . G i v e nt h a ti nt h i sc a s eu(a1,x 1;α) >u (a2,x 2;α)∀α,i fp1 ≤ p2 no
household would want to live in community 2.




which, together with corollary 1, serves to characterize the equilibrium segregation
patterns.
3. We proved this point in lemma 3.
The segregation patterns characterizing this kind of equilibrium are similar to
those of case 1. Because community 1 oﬀers a combination (a,x) which provides
higher utility to all households, in equilibrium that community’s gross-of-tax housing
price must be higher. Willingness to pay for housing in such community increases
with income. It also increases with the taste parameter as this community oﬀers
a higher level of provision. Thus, households of higher income and those of lower
income but stronger preferences for x are those which in equilibrium reside in this
community.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we provided an investigation about the impact of ﬁscal decentralization
on income segregation. To this end we developed a positive and static model of
a metropolitan area made up of two communities in which: (i) the public sector
may be centralized or decentralized; (ii) the central government oﬀers a publicly
provided good in the same quantity to the whole population, while local governments
adjust their level of provision to their constituents’ preferences; (iii) communities
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Figure 9
more appealing than the other; and (iv) households diﬀer in income and in their
preferences for the publicly provided good. In this setting, we showed that, under
quite general circumstances, and contrary to what the previous literature suggested,
ﬁscal decentralization reduces income segregation in urban areas. We revealed that
it may even lead to equilibria in which income segregation across communities does
not take place at all.
The intuition behind this result is that, on the one hand, the alternative to ﬁscal
decentralization is a reality of segregation, not one where population lives in inte-
grated cities. This is in line with the diagnosis carried out in the United Nation’s
paper World’s Cities State Report (UN-Habitat, 2001). And, on the other hand,
that there being diﬀerences in the preferences for the publicly provided good, decen-
tralization generates incentives for households of the same income level to be located
in diﬀerent communities. Those showing a strong preference for this good tend to
live in communities where the level of provision is high. Those others for whom
40the consumption of this good has a smaller impact on their wellbeing tend to live
in communities where the level of provision is lower. This promotes the mixing of
households with diﬀerent income levels within communities, that is to say, the exis-
tence of communities inhabited by a more heterogenous population according to their
l e v e lo fi n c o m e .
This is a very general result. It is independent from a number of assumptions we
adopted to ease the analysis and to clarify the exposition. It is easy to prove that it
extends to cases in which: (1) amenities are endogenous and (2) the slope of housing
supply curves is positive until it reaches the community maximum capacity. It is
also independent from certain aspects of the public sector’s institutional design. The
only relevant aspect of the institutional framework is that, whereas decentralization
leads each local government to adapt their level of provision to the preferences of
their jurisdiction’s citizens, the central government is obliged (and able) to oﬀer an
homogeneous level of the publicly provided good for the whole population. There-
fore, an assumption which is indeed important is that the level of output of the
publicly provided good does not depend on the community’s demographic composi-
tion. Alternatively, the central government should be able and willing to compensate
for the existence of output diﬀerences stemming from diﬀerences in the demographic
composition.
This result could be seen as a new equity argument in favor of ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion, as income segregation is a source of persistent income inequality. However, the
analysis also suggests the existence of a trade-oﬀ among the level of income segre-
gation and the diﬀerences among communities with respect to the level of provision
they oﬀer to their residents: with no diﬀerences across communities income segrega-
tion is maximum; as diﬀerences in the level of provision increase, taste sorting tends
to substitute income sorting and income segregation falls.
41An interesting line for further research would focus on the case where the quality
of the publicly provided good is aﬀected by the community’s demographic composi-
tion and the central government is not able to equalize the quality of the publicly
provided good across communities. It is important to establish whether (and under
which circumstances) the result in this paper holds in such situation. This seems
particularly relevant for the case of education. The so-called peer group eﬀects make
a student’s class and school composition signiﬁcantly aﬀect their achievement. More-
over, diﬀerences in the quality of educational institutions generated by the peer group
cannot be easily compensated by means of a higher provision of economic resources.
Finally, attempts to equalize peer quality across schools have been scarce and diﬃcult
to implement.
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